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AINE DE BIRAN was said by Cousin to have been the first
of French metaphysicians since Malebranche. This is true,
especially, if we understand by a metaphysician, as they did in the
eighteenth century, a thinker who studies the origin of our knowl-
edge, and the genesis of our ideas. Yet this original and deep
philosopher was but little known to his contemporaries. Maine de
Biran, though he wrote much, published but little during his life-
time, and what he gave to the world was not sufficient to make his
thought fully understood. It was Cousin, who, in 1834, and after-
wards in 1841, edited part of the manuscripts left by Maine de
Biran. Since then other unpublished works have been edited,
chiefly by M. Naville. If we have not yet the whole of Maine de
Biran's writings, we possess enough to feel assured that no essential
part of his doctrine now escapes us.
Maine de Biran never taught. Being a life-guardsman to
Louis the Sixteenth in 1789, and later sub-prefect, and councillor
of State, if he was also a philosopher it was in virtue of a strong
natural aptitude and inclination. A sort of instinct irresistibly
impelled him to make a study of himself. His health being delicate,
he was watchful of the slightest changes in his physical condition
and in his consciousness due to surrounding circumstances, and
was consequently predisposed to introspection. "When one has
little vitality," he writes, "or but a faint conscious sense of
vitality, one is more inclined to observe internal phenomena. This
is why I became so early in life a psychologist." He heard the
springs of the machine creaking, and he felt his thought straining
or slackening with them.
His taste for psychology first found food in Condillac, and then
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in the Ideologists. He became acquainted with Cabanis, and was
afterwards his friend ; and though later he thought that he had
advanced beyond his doctrine, he never completely rejected it. But
he also read the Genevese Charles Bonnet, and it was probably by
him that he was led to stud}' the philosophy of Leibnitz, and to
seek a psychological interpretation of it that would be in harmony
with his own tendencies. It was at this time that he wrote his
Mcmoire sur VHabitude (1805), an original and thoughtful work,
which, under a form that suggests Condillac, already manifests
Victor Cousin (1792-1867).
many of his own personal and independent views. In the next
period he reached the clearest expression of his thought and ex-
pounded what he looked upon as his most important theory, to
wit, the theory of effort, or of the first fact of consciousness.
In this he was seconded by his friend Ampere, the celebrated
physicist, whose philosophical work is inseparable from his own.
He often enunciated his ideas at philosophical meetings held at his
house in Paris. Royer-Collard was wont to be present, and also
"young Professor Cousin," who comprehended the thought of
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Maine de Biran marvellously well. In later years, when ill, and
anxious to find a "firm and steady prop," Maine de Biran inclined
towards a mystical and religious kind of philosophy; and he had
yielded himself fully to it before the end of his life.
Condillac's psychology had separated, so to speak, conscious
ness from organism. Convinced that "we never get out of our-
selves," he thought himself thus justified in studying only what
reflection and analysis can reach and decompose within ourselves.
Now this is an abstraction which Maine de Biran constantly finds
to be contradicted by his personal experience. Our humor changes,
our attention flags, our self-confidence disappears or returns with-
out our knowing how ; is it not because a multitude of dim sensa-
tions are produced within us, of which we are made aware only by
their effects? Thus experimental psychology can as yet describe
only the smallest portion of the soul's phenomena. This science
begins with clear apperception, and with the distinction between
the "self" and its modifications. But how many things take place
in the soul before, during, and after the first consciousness of the
self, which will never come within the range of our knowledge !
These things Maine de Biran calls pure impressions, or simple
impressions; they constitute the "affective life." They correspond
to Leibnitz's dim and insensible perceptions ; or, perhaps more
exactly, to Cabanis's "sensibility." "These impersonal sensations,
which I shall term pure affections, may be considered as the most
immediate results of functions that underlie a general organic life
.... a state previous even to the birth of a conscious and think-
ing subject." This was a fruitful thought, which experimental
psychology has turned to excellent account in our days. This
science admits as a principle, as Maine de Biran did, that "simple
impressions may constitute an absolute sort of existence, sui generis,
apart from any distinct personality or consciousness of self. M.
Pierre Ganet, for instance, has returned to this hypothesis in order
to explain many surprising cases of hysterical anesthesia and
amnesia, of twofold personality, etc.
This part of ourselves which escapes our knowledge also
escapes our power. The affective life is independent of our will,
though our* will depends upon it. It is a purely passive basis of
our complex being, from which the Ego can never be separated,
and which becomes tense or slack or altered without our being able
to interfere, at any rate directly; a sum of organic dispositions we
are the less able to modify since they are the very source of our
powers and volitions. They result from our temperament, and
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what we call character is but the physiognomy of temperament^a
striking phrase, for which we are indebted to Bichat, the physiolo-
gist, and which Maine de Biran made his own by exploring it
thoroughly.
At about the same epoch Schopenhauer in German}' was say-
ing the same thing; and though he was in nowise acquainted with
the works of Maine de Biran, there is in this more than a mere
fortuitous coincidence. Between Schopenhauer's psychology,' and
that of Maine de Biran there lie hidden, under obvious differences,
deep analogies. If little attention has hitherto been paid in France
to this fact, it is because of a predisposition to see in Maine de
Biran one of the founders of contemporary spiritualism,—and he
is therefore associated with Cousin rather than with Bichat or
Cabanis.
But this interpretation, while not false, is certainly incomplete,
and not in harmony with history. Maine de Biran owes nothing to
Cousin, and was, especially in his two earlier periods, imbued with
the doctrines of Bichat and of the "immortal author of the Rappor/s
du Physique et du Moral.'" Now this was no less true of Schopen-
hauer. True, in Schopenhauer the ideas borrowed from Bichat
and Cabanis were mingled with other elements taken from Kant,
Plato, and Buddhist metaphysics, whereas Maine de Biran con-
tented himself with investigating certain problems propounded by
the eighteenth century. Yet both these men alike oppose to the
conscious personality of the Ego the dim unconscious background
which enfolds it, sways it, and even directs it, and predetermines,
unknown to ourselves, our thoughts and actions, our intelligence
and character. Only afterwards do their doctrines diverge.
Affective life constitutes in us what Maine de Biran calls "ani-
mality." Above it, but linked to it, appears "humanity," i. e.,
consciousness reflecting on itself and master of itself, personality,
or the Ego. This latter begins to exist by itself only when exer-
cising free activity or determined effort. Thus—and Maine de
Biran likes to remind us that he is here taking up the thought of
Leibnitz- the idea that the human person has of itself is originally
the idea of an active force. The Ego is first of all activity and lib-
erty. In other words, the Ego is the soul, insomuch as it perceives
its own existence, but this it perceives only when its activity meets
(within the body) with a resistance which it endeavors to over-
come.
If this observation is correct, the whole structure of Condillac-
ism falls to pieces. Sensation is no longer the first fact of con-
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sciousness, the principle of all the soul's life. The very term
"sensation" is abstract and ambiguous, because Condillac did not
carry the analysis far enough. For, if sensation be conceived as
simply passive, then it is only an "affective impression," and the
Ego does not yet appear : sensation may take place without con-
sciousness being aware of it. Does sensation imply a motor reac-
tion, conscious and deliberate? Then it resolves itself into a pas-
sive and an active element. The latter is intentional effort. In it,
and not in any received impression, must we seek the special ori-
gin of our active faculties, the pivotal' point of existence and the
foundation of all the simple ideas we may acquire concerning our-
selves and our intellectual activity.
Yet Maine de Biran does not think that the soul appears to it-
self just as it really is. " I was at first rather inclined," he says,
"to mistake the inmost feeling of our individuality, or what I
called the Ego, for the very core of the substance of the soul. But
Kant has taught me better. We feel our own individuality ; but
the real substance of our soul we feel no more than any other sub-
stance." No doubt the Ego that perceives and judges is the same
that is perceived and judged; but this being which is perceived
and judged has still an inmost core of substance inaccessible to
apperception. It may be endowed, as Malebranche thought, with
a multitude of properties or attributes which are unknown or do not
come within the range of our inward sense. This inward sense may
indeed assure us that 7ve are thinking ; and on this point Descartes's
"I think, therefore I am," is irrefutable. But the most subtle
analysis of this inward sense cannot possibly throw the slightest
light upon our knowledge of ourselves, "as an object, outside of
thought." To believe that, by means of analysis based on purely
internal experience, we can at length arrive at the notion of a sub-
stantial Ego, is to mistake the psychological fact of what is within
us, that is, ourselves in the actual exercise of thought, for the meta-
physical notion of the substance which is supposed to remain the
same beyond and beneath thought.
Maine de Biran here agrees with Kant, as he says. In Kant,
however, the theory of the Ego's knowledge of itself has for its
basis the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason, and more especially
the theory of sensible and intellectual knowledge. Maine de Biran,
on the contrary, starts from the analysis of the first fact of con-
sciousness, and on that analysis he afterwards attempts to found a
theory of the understanding and reason. In opposition to the doc-
trine of categories, which is quite a priori in Kant, he endeavors to
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maintain a psychological genesis of the general principles of
thought. Thus, because the Ego perceives itself as a cause, Maine
de Biran finds therein "the pattern and model of every idea of
power, force, and cause." Unity, simplicity, existence, etc., are
ideas which the Ego obtains by means of an abstraction wrought
upon itself, and which in a way isolates its own attributes. If we
find these attributes again in objects, it is because they have been,
so to speak, projected by the Ego. In one word, reason is thus
held to be the spontaneous result of a sort of self-analysis of con-
sciousness.
But this is rather a sketch than a regular theory, and Maine
de Biran was suspicious of everything that might carry him beyond
the firm ground of experience. The science he seeks to establish
starts from a fact and must lead only to facts and to the laws which
they obey. The absolute, as Maine de Biran does not hesitate to
confess, is beyond its grasp. How, he says himself, could all things
fail to be relative in our eyes, since the very existence of the Ego,
the individual personality which is the basis of the thinking being,
is relative? The thing called Ego being a compound, or the result
of the union and relation between two substances, can conceive or
feel nothing but as a compound or relation. The very idea of sub-
stance seems suspicious to Maine to Biran. The Ego does not
find it within itself, for it apprehends itself as a cause, not as a sub-
stance. This idea must, therefore, originate without our knowing
it, in the representation of exterior things, space and matter. It
was this idea that caused the philosophy of Descartes to tend in the
direction of pantheism. It is the secret enemy of personality and
liberty; it tends to mingle together in an obscure metaphysical
unity the Ego-person in which everything has its beginning, and
the God-person in which all things end.
Though an original and deep psychologist, Maine de Biran
was a timid metaphysician. No doubt the study of the Ego induced
him to think of it as a " hyperorganic " force, while the inward
sense assured him of his liberty ; but he was fully aware that there
are problems, and most essential ones, to which his doctrine gives
no direct answer, the moral problem, "for instance. Therefore he
wished to complete his psychology by a reasoned adherence to a
general system of philosophy in accordance with his inmost tend-
encies. In his second period he felt himself won over to Stoicism,
which is, in his eyes, a moral philosophy based upon the dignity
of the human personality and upon the energy of active effort.
But Stoicism expects too much from man's will; and although
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Christianity, in its turn, makes man too weak and helpless, it was
to Christianity that Maine de Biran turned in the latter years of his
life for the "prop" of which he felt the need. He then wrote his
Xouvcaux Essais (f Ant/iropologie, which distinguish in man three
lives, one above the other, as it were: sensitive life, which is in us
that of the animal; human life, that is, the life of action and the
struggle of the thinking principle against the instinctive and ani-
mal principle; and lastly, divine life, in which animalism is con-
quered and the struggle ceases because love has united man to the
supreme source of all beings and all good. And thus, in a sort of
quietism, ended this philosophy which had begun as a continuation
of Condillac and Cabanis.
